On May 4, 1954, the enemy discussed how to open a "bloody path" to escape.

The Albatros (Seagull) withdrawal plan was expected to be carried out at 8:00 p.m. on May 7, 1954. According to journalist Giuyn Roa: "In Dien Bien Phu, people call this operation opening a bloody path."

On our side: On May 4, 1954, at the invitation of the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the People's Republic of China, a delegation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam led by Comrade Pham Van Dong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, went to Geneva to discuss the issue of restoring peace in Indochina.

Geneva Conference on restoring peace in Indochina. Photo courtesy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs .

On the night of May 4, 1954, in the western field, after destroying 311A, the 308th Division continued to attack 311B (Huguette 4) inside. The 36th Regiment destroyed a company of foreign legionnaires and Moroccan soldiers, bringing the battlefield closer to the Lilie resistance center, the last screen protecting the De Castries Command Post in this direction. In the morning, the enemy counterattacked to retake it but failed.

The French army at Dien Bien Phu at this time had about 5,385 combat troops and 1,282 wounded. Compared to after the second attack, the enemy had more troops due to reinforcements. The central area was less than ^1km2 .

A corner of the French stronghold in Dien Bien Phu destroyed by our army. Photo: VNA

After 15 days and nights of steadfastness and perseverance in carrying out their mission, the engineering unit successfully completed the task of digging a 49m long tunnel. On the afternoon and night of May 4, 1954, nearly 1,000kg of explosives were placed safely at the end of the tunnel. On the same day, the Front Command met to discuss the completion of the mission of the third offensive phase and decided to quickly switch to a general attack on the entire front to win the campaign.

On the enemy side: On May 4, Cogny telegraphed De Castries, informing him of some instructions on the withdrawal according to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief: "The Northwestern Operational Group (GONO) is given the right to choose the method and time according to its own initiative after receiving the order".

Cogny instructed De Castries to destroy tanks, cannons, secret documents, codes and radio equipment. But he did not forget to emphasize: "Until further orders, the GONO Commander must maintain the task of resisting in place, must not have the idea of ​​retreating, must keep the plan secret and prepare to implement it with the utmost caution." Cogny believed that fleeing Dien Bien Phu would only lead to useless sacrifice.

French commanders at Dien Bien Phu, 1954. Photo archive

During the day, under the pouring rain, De Castries met with senior officers of Muong Thanh to announce the Albatros plan. Langlais, Lemeunier, Bigeard, Vadot and Seguin Pazzis were present. The enemy's trenches were tightly surrounded, with no gaps left. However, everyone agreed to split into three wings when retreating. The first wing, consisting of all paratroopers, was commanded by Bigeard. The second wing, consisting of all foreign and North African troops, was commanded by Lemeunier and Vadot. The third wing, consisting of all troops in Hong Cum, was commanded by Langlais. There were three routes of retreat: the first through Keo Lom village, the second along Nam Nua valley, and the third in the direction of Nam Hop. The route running south-southeast seemed less dangerous and everyone had to draw lots. The retreat plan was expected to be implemented at 8:00 p.m. on May 7, 1954. According to journalist Giuyn Roa: "In Dien Bien Phu, people called this march opening a bloody path."

THANH VINH/qdnd.vn

Source: https://baothanhhoa.vn/chien-dich-dien-bien-phu-ngay-4-5-1954-dich-ban-cach-mo-con-duong-mau-thao-chay-213243.htm