The Central Highlands Campaign - the art of deception in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising

Editor 's note : In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Liberation of Phu Yen province ( April 1 , 1975 - April 1 , 2025 ) and the liberation of the South , and the reunification of the country ( April 30 , 1975 - April 30 , 2025 ) , Phu Yen Newspaper introduces to readers articles to review the arduous and heroic historical period of struggle of the entire Party , army and people , under the leadership of the Party .​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​At the same time , continue to affirm the great contributions of the army and people of Phu Yen together with the whole country to the great victory of spring 1975 , unifying the country .​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

 

The Central Highlands Campaign (March 4-April 3, 1975), the opening blow in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, which our army and people won, created a turning point that changed the situation of the war. The success of the campaign affirmed the correct leadership of the Party Central Committee, marked the remarkable growth of the Southern Liberation Army, and the rapid decline of the army and the Saigon government.

 

Maintain the strategic offensive line​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

 

The Central Highlands at that time had an area of ​​about 60,000 km ² , including the provinces of Kon Tum , Pleiku, Phu Bon, Dak Lak and part of Quang Duc province; considered by the French as the "roof of Indochina". Whoever controlled this area would control Indochina. Replacing the French colonialists, the American imperialists paid more attention to this military strategic position. The US and the Saigon government increased many measures to restrain the ethnic people, preventing the revolutionary movement in the Central Highlands. However, with the spirit of uprising, the army and people of the Central Highlands continuously fought, gradually defeating the enemy's plots and acts of invasion. Especially, with the victory in the northern Central Highlands in 1972, they contributed with the army and people of the whole country to strike a decisive blow, forcing the US to sign the Paris Agreement, ending the war, and restoring peace in Vietnam.

 

However, the US still secretly provided military aid and urged the Saigon government to sabotage the Paris Agreement, plotting to permanently divide our country. In that situation, in July 1973, the Party Central Committee held its 21st Conference, clearly stating: The path forward for the Southern revolution is the path of violent revolution. Regardless of the situation, we must firmly grasp the opportunity and maintain the strategic offensive line...

 

In March 1974, the Central Military Commission held a meeting and advocated efforts to build up forces, especially the main force, to gradually improve the level of fighting and destroying. Accordingly, from the end of 1973 to 1974, all battlefields in the South switched to counter-attacks and determined attacks, defeating the enemy's plot to encroach on land and seize people. In the Central Highlands, we captured the bases of Chu Nghe, Mang Den, Mang But..., expanding the liberated area west of Highway 14 and north of Kon Tum City.

 

Entering the spring - summer of 1975, the Politburo , directly the Central Military Commission, decided to launch the Central Highlands Campaign, aiming to destroy an important part of the enemy's forces, liberate the provinces of Dak Lak, Phu Bon, Quang Duc, carry out division and create a new strategic position on the battlefield of the whole South. The Campaign Command was led by Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao as Commander, Colonel Dang Vu Hiep as Political Commissar. The forces participating in the campaign included 5 divisions (10, 320, 316, 3, 968) and 4 infantry regiments, 1 regiment and 2 special forces battalions, 2 artillery regiments, 1 tank - armored regiment (T-TG), 3 anti-aircraft artillery regiments.

 

At this time, the Saigon government believed that: In 1975, we were not strong enough to attack towns and cities, and if we did, we would only attack in the Northern Central Highlands; even if we gained the area, we would not be able to hold it when they counterattacked and recaptured it. Therefore, with a force consisting of: 23rd Infantry Division, 7 Ranger Battalions, 36 Security Battalions, 1 T-TG Brigade, 230 artillery pieces, 1 Air Force Division, the Saigon army focused on holding Pleiku and Kon Tum; while the enemy forces in Buon Ma Thuot were not strong, mostly the rear bases of divisions and regiments, the deeper in, the thinner the enemy forces. In the Central Highlands battlefield, Buon Ma Thuot Town was the location of the Saigon army's 23rd Division Command Headquarters and the provincial capital of Dak Lak; This area is located at a strategic intersection, with Highway 21 connecting Nha Trang and Highway 14, to the North to Cheo Reo and Pleiku, to the South to Gia Nghia and the Southeast. By liberating Buon Ma Thuot, we have taken control of an extremely important strategic area to develop in all directions, separating the Central Highlands from other regions, controlling the enemy, and gaining greater initiative. Not only that, Buon Ma Thuot is also a symbol of the stability of the Saigon government in the Central Highlands and the South.

 

Based on the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the battlefield, the Politburo, the Central Military Commission and the General Command decided to choose Buon Ma Thuot City as the strategic breakthrough point to start the Central Highlands Campaign. Implementing the above determination, General Vo Nguyen Giap proposed two options to attack Buon Ma Thuot: If the enemy has not yet reinforced their forces, attack immediately. If the enemy reinforced their forces in Buon Ma Thuot, lure the enemy out, attack and destroy the enemy in Cam Ga and Thuan Man. In both cases, we must carry out diversionary tactics in the direction of Tri - Thien, Kon Tum and Pleiku.

 

The Saigon army 's retreat​​​​​​​​​​​​

 

On March 4, 1975, after a series of diversionary operations to lure the Saigon army to Pleiku and Kon Tum, the Central Highlands campaign officially opened with a position-building operation. Regiment 95A was ordered to cut off traffic on Highway 19, destroy a number of traffic posts, and completely control a 20km stretch of road. At the same time, Division 320 organized an attack to cut off Highway 14 in the northern Cam Ga area, separating the northern and southern Central Highlands. On Highway 21, Regiment 25 carried out an attack to cut off the road in the East of Chu Cuc. The resulting division completely cut off communication between Quy Nhon City and Pleiku - Kon Tum City, between Nha Trang City and Buon Ma Thuot City... The attacks of the Central Highlands Liberation Army pulled most of the enemy forces toward Kon Tum - Pleiku. On March 9, 1975, our army organized an attack to destroy the enemy in Duc Lap, aiming to attract more attention from the Saigon army in this direction.

 

After deploying forces to form a siege, the combined arms force with four main forces, combined with elite units and infantry battalions secretly infiltrated and deployed, bypassing the outlying posts, using large forces to attack directly into the town center, smashing the 23rd Division Command of the Saigon army and the Dak Lak Sub-region Command. On the morning of March 10, 1975, our army opened fire on Buon Ma Thuot, our special forces and artillery opened fire on Hoa Binh airport, the 53rd Regiment's rear base, Buon Ma Thuot city airport and Mai Hac De warehouse area. The campaign artillery clusters fired heavily at the 23rd Division Command of the Saigon army, the Dak Lak Sub-region Command and the armored area. By the afternoon of March 10, we had captured most of the town. At this time, the Saigon government knew that Buon Ma Thuot was our main direction of attack. On the morning of March 11, our troops from all directions attacked the 23rd Division Headquarters and the remaining targets, gaining complete control of Buon Ma Thuot City. The Saigon government organized the 23rd Division forces along with the remnants of the 53rd Regiment and the 21st Ranger Group to launch a counterattack in an attempt to retake Buon Ma Thuot, but were completely crushed by the Liberation Army.

 

From March 15, after two major defeats in Buon Ma Thuot, the Saigon government decided to withdraw from Kon Tum and Pleiku, sending troops to defend the coastal plains of the Central region. A strategic retreat of the Saigon army began. The Liberation Army organized a pursuit and destroyed almost all of the enemy troops fleeing in Cheo Reo and Cung Son. Coordinating the main direction, the armed forces attacked and liberated An Khe (March 12), Kon Tum, Pleiku (March 17), Kien Duc (March 20), Gia Nghia (March 22). After controlling the Central Highlands (March 24), the troops continued to develop down to the Central Coast along Highways 19, 7 and 21, liberating Binh Khe, Phu Yen, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh. On April 3, 1975, the Central Highlands Campaign ended in victory. We destroyed and disintegrated the 2nd Corps and Military Region 2 of the Saigon army, eliminating more than 28,000 enemy soldiers from combat, capturing and destroying 154 aircraft, 1,096 military vehicles, 17,188 guns of all kinds...

 

By using the art of creating situations and deceiving the enemy, the Central Highlands Campaign destroyed and disintegrated a large defensive group, liberated an important area, directly threatened the coastal defense line of the Central region, and marked the end of the Saigon regime.

The key victory in capturing Buon Ma Thuot City caused a chain reaction, contributing to rapidly changing the situation on the battlefield, opening up the opportunity for a strategic general offensive, creating a decisive turning point, bringing the resistance war against the US to a quick and victorious end. With that meaning, the Central Highlands Campaign was truly a vital blow to the Saigon army in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising.

 

(ND)

Source: https://baophuyen.vn/76/326441/chien-dich-tay-nguyen-nghe-thuat-nghi-binh-trong-cuoc-tong-tien-cong-va-noi-day-mua-xuan-1975.html